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MURPHY v. NETHERLAND
116 F.3d 97 (4th Cir. 1997)
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit

FACTS

Mario Murphy pleaded guilty to murder-for-hire and to conspiracy
to commit capital murder, and was consequently sentenced to death. 1
Murphy was hired by Robin Radcliff (hereinafter "Radcliff") and her
lover, Gary Hinojosa, to kill Robin's husband, James Radcliff (hereinafter "the victim"). 2 After one failed attempt, Murphy enlisted the help of
two other men, Aaron Turner and James Hall. 3 The three men, with the
help of Radcliff and Hinojosa, planned to stage a burglary in which they
would kill the victim. In preparation, Radcliff drove Murphy to her
apartmentbuilding, pointed out the victim's car, and told him the specific
bedroom in which the victim slept.4
OnJuly28,1991, afterdressing andanningthemselves atHinojosa's
home, Murphy, Turner, and Hall went to the Radcliffapartment. 5 There,6
they entered through a window that Radcliff had left unlocked for them.
As they made their way down the hallway, Radcliff left the bedroom in
which her husband was sleeping, walked past the three men, and went to
the living room.7 Murphy, Turner, and Hall entered the bedroom, where,
using a metal pipe and two knives, they beat and stabbed the victim to
death. On their way out of the apartment, following the instructions of
Radcliff and Hinojosa"to makeit look like arobbery," the three men took
8
a videocassette recorder and a video game.
Following his arrest on September 4, 1992, Murphy waived his
constitutional rights and confessed to killing the victim.9 The Virginia
Beach Circuit Court found Murphy's guilty pleas to murder-for-hire and
to conspiracy to commit murder both voluntary and intelligent. 10 At a
separate sentencing hearing, the court found that: (1) Murphy's actions
constituted "aggravated battery"; (2) Murphy exhibited "depravity of
mind"; and (3) Murphy was "a continuing serious threat to society."lI
The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed both the convictions and the
12
sentences.
Murphy's efforts on state habeas proved equally unsuccessful, as all
of his habeas claims were dismissed upon findings that they were either
procedurally barred or without merit. 13 Furthermore, his appeal to the
Supreme Court of Virginia was dismissed as untimely after being filed
14
one day too late.
Murphy filed a federal habeas petition, claiming that his conviction
and death sentence were unconstitutional because the local authorities
1Murphy v. Netherland, 116 F.3d 97, 98 (4th Cir. 1997).
Murphy, 116 F.3d at 98.
3
Id.
4
Murphy v. Commonwealth, 246 Va. 136, 139,431 S.E.2d 48,50
(1993).
5
Murphy, 116 F.3d at 98.
6
Id.at 98.
7
Murphy v. Commonwealth, 246 Va. 136, 139,431 S.E.2d 48, 50
(1993).
8Id.at 140, 431 S.E.2d at 50.
9
Id. at 141,431 S.E.2d at 51.
10 Murphy, 116 F.3d at 99.
111d.
12
ld.
13
1d.
14
Murphy, 116 F.3d at 99.
2

did not inform him that, as a foreign national of Mexico, he had a right
under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations to speak to the
consulate of Mexico. 15 The district court rejected this claim because it
was not raised in state court, and, therefore, was procedurally defaulted.
Murphy appealed the denial of his habeas petition, arguing that the
violation of his rights under the Vienna Convention rendered his guilty
16
plea involuntary.
HOLDING
The United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, denied the
motion for a certificate of appealability and dismissed the appeal,
holding that (1) petitioner's claim under the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations did not involve a denial of any constitutional right;
17
and (2) any such claim was procedurally barred.
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
I.

The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
A.

Background

The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations was unanimously
adoptedby the more than 100 participating countries on April 24,1963.18
Under Article 36 of the Convention, a citizen of one country who is
arrested in another country is given the right to contact the country's
consul, and consequently the consul is allowed to visit the detainee and
provide assistance. 19 The various forms of consular assistance which
15

1d.
16 Id.
17 1d. at 100.
18
Uribe, Consulsat Work: UniversalInstrumentsofHuman Rights
andConsularProtectionin the Context of CriminalJustice, 19 Hous. J.
Int'l L. 375, 384 (1997).
19
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21
U.S.T. 77, 100-01, 596 U.N.T.S. 261, 292-94 (hereinafter Vienna
Convention). Article 36(1) of the Vienna Convention states:
1. With a view to facilitating the exercise of consular functions
relating to nationals of the sending State:
(a) consular officers shall be free to communicate with
nationals of the sending State and to have access to them.
Nationals of the sending State shall have the same freedom with respect to communication with and access to
consular officers of the sending State;
(b) if he so requests, the competent authorities of the
receiving State shall, without delay, inform the consular
post of the sending State if, within its consular district, a
national ofthat State is arrested or committed to prison or
to custody pending trial or is detained in any other
manner. Any communication addressed to the consular
post by the person arrested, in prison, custody or detention shall also be forwarded by the said authorities without delay. The said authorities shall inform the person
concerned without delay of his rights under this subparagraph;
(c) consular officers shall have the right to visit a national
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can be provided, including legal assistance, are enumerated in Article 5
on the right to
of the Convention. 20 These consular functions depend
21
communicate with and have access to the nationals.
The United States ratified the Vienna Convention on November 24,
1969,22 thereby making it the "supreme Law of the Land" under the
23
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, and binding upon
24
both federal and state authorities. Nevertheless, jurisprudence illustrates quite a different outcome for claims under the Vienna Convention
in the courts of the United States. 25 Courts generally admit that a
violation of the international treaty has occurred, but they consistently
of the sending State who is in prison, custody or detention,
to converse and correspond with him and to arrange for
his legal representation. They shall also have the right to
visit any national of the sending State who is in prison,
custody or detention in their district in pursuance of a
judgment.
20 See id. art. 5, 21 U.S.T. at 82-85, 596 U.N.T.S. at 268-70.
According to Article 5 ofthe Convention, consular functions include: the
protection and assistance of co-nationals in the sending State; the
protection of the interests of the sending State and of its nationals, both
individuals and bodies corporate, in accordance with the laws of the
receiving State; the protection ofthe interests ofminors and otherpersons
lacking full capacity who are nationals of the sending State, within the
limits imposed by the laws of the receiving state; the representation or
arrangement of appropriate representation for co-nationals before local
tribunals and other authorities insofar as the laws of the receiving State
permit; and the assistance of vessels, aircraft, and their crews with the
nationality of the sending Statein accordance with the laws of the sending
State.
21 Uribe, 19 Hous. J. Int'l L. at 387.
22
Vienna Convention, 21 U.S.T. at 77.
23
U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. The Supremacy Clause states that, "all
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of
any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."
24
Uribe, 19 Hous. J.Int'l L. at 407.
25
SeeFaulderv.Johnson, 81 F.3d 515 (5thCir. 1996), cert.denied,
117 S.Ct. 487(1996). InFaulder,a Canadiannational, working in Texas,
was convicted and sentenced to death for the robbery-murder of a local
resident. During his federal appeals process, Faulder's attorneys raised
the claim that Faulder had been denied his right to consular access under
the Vienna Convention. The Canadian government itself filed an amicus
brief on behalf of Faulder, stating that the denial of these rights under
international law may have prevented Faulder from getting a fair trial.
Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit found the omission to be harmless error,
explaining that the defendant had access to all of the information that
could have been acquired by the Canadian government. 81 F.3d at 520.
Furthermore, the court noted that the evidence that would have been
acquired by the Canadian government was merely the same as or
cumulative of evidence Faulder's counsel had or could have gotten. Id.
The evidence, characterized by the court as "merely the same," which
Faulder's counsel could have obtained from his homeland included the
following: the fact that Faulder suffered from permanent organic brain
damageafteraseverechildhoodinjury,favorabletestimonyfromFaulder's
family in Canada, and the fact that Faulder had never been convicted or
accused of violent acts in Canada. See Urbine, 19 Hous. J. Int'l L. at 9192 n.220.
See also Montoya v. State, 810 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
In Montoya, a Mexican national was convicted of capital murder and
sentenced to death in a Texas district court for the stabbing death and
robbery of a U.S. citizen. The prosecution centered their case around a
confession Montoya signed after several hours of police interrogation,

dismiss capital defendants' Vienna Convention claims as harmless error
26
or insufficient to allow federal habeas relief.
B.

Murphy's Vienna Convention Claim

The courts in Virginia did not deviate from this pattern with regard
to Mario Murphy's Vienna Convention claim. Murphy first raised this
claim in his federal habeas petition in April 1996, alleging that both his
conviction and death sentence were constitutionally invalid because
local authorities failed to inform him of his right to contact the Mexican
consulate under the Vienna Convention. 27 The district court dismissed
Murphy's claim, holding that it was procedurally defaulted because it
28
had not been raised in state court.
Similarly, the court of appeals found Murphy's Vienna Convention
claim to be procedurally defaulted, in that he had not previously argued
that the violation of the Vienna Convention rendered his guilty plea
involuntary. 29 Furthermore, the court found that Murphy did not satisfy
the requirements to obtain a certificate of appealability, in that he failed
30
to make"' asubstantial showing ofthe denial of aconstitutional right.'
prior to his initial appearance before any court, and before counsel had
been appointed to represent him. Despite the fact that Montoya was
unable to read, write or speak English, his confession was in English.
Moreover, the confession occurred after a midnight arrest, at which time
the defendant was intoxicated. The defendant was placed in solitary
confinement overnight and suffered from sleep deprivation at the time of
the interrogation. 81 S.W.2d at 173. Montoya was never informed ofhis
Vienna Convention right to contact his consul. Montoya claimed that
this denial significantly impaired his right to counsel. The court rejected
his claim, noting "[w]e find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's
decision concerning the voluntariness of the confession." Id. at 174.
See alsoBreardv. Netherland,949 F.Supp. 1255 (E.D. Va. 1996).
In Breard, a dual citizen of Paraguay and Argentina, who had been
convicted and sentenced to death for capital murder and attempted rape,
filed a petition for writ ofhabeas corpus in district court. In responding
to Breard's claim that the Commonwealth had denied him his Vienna
Convention rights, the court noted that "Virginia's persistent refusal to
abide by the Vienna Convention troubles the Court." 949 F.Supp. at
1263. Notwithstanding, the court held that the claim was procedurally
defaulted and that federal review was barred. Furthermore, the court
found that Virginia's consistent denial of Vienna Convention rights was
not just cause for the default, noting "[Virginia's] failure to comply with
the Vienna Convention didnotpreventBreard's counsel from raising the
issue during state proceedings. The only predicate fact required to raise
the claim was the knowledge of Breard's foreign nationality." Id.
26 Itis interesting to note that although the United States does not
strictly adhere to the Vienna Convention in the case of foreign nationals
in the United States, it has been quick to demand that other countries
uphold the Convention with regard to U.S. citizens detained by other
countries. See Doherty, Foreign Affairs v. Federalism: How State
Control of Criminal Law Implicates Federal Responsibility Under
InternationalLaw,82 Va. L. Rev. 1281,1345 n.165 (1996). In 1975, the
United States protested Syria's arrest of two U.S. citizens and its failure
to notify the AmericanEmbassy. In atelegram to Syria, the United States
spoke of the Vienna Convention as a type of international law, stating
that: "The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic can be confident that
ifits nationals were detained in the United States the appropriate Syrian
officials would be promptly notified and allowed prompt access to those
nationals." Id. (quoting Dep't of State Telegram 40298 to Embassy
Damascus, Feb. 21, 1975).
27
Murphy, 116 F.3d at 99.
28Id.
29
1d. at 100.
30
Id.at 99 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2)).
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The court reasoned that the Supremacy Clause does not transform
violations of treaty provisions into violations of constitutional rights.
Therefore, according to the court of appeals, the Vienna Convention is
31
said to create "individual" rights, but not "constitutional" rights.
Murphy's failed Vienna Convention claim reiterates the importance of raising all issues as early as possible in capital cases. Once a
capital defense attorney realizes he or she is representing a foreign
national, it is imperative to determine whether the client received the
benefits of the Vienna Convention. If the client did not, counsel should
move for a dismissal at the trial level of the charges and should establish
factually the violation and the effects of the violation. If the trial court
denies the motion, counsel should preserve the issue for appeal.
The rights afforded under the Vienna Convention raise several
important and potentially beneficial issues for the capital defendant. For
example, the defendant may have had language barriers or deficient
understandings of the American legal system at the time of his or her
arrest. These problems could be alleviated by contact with a consulate
at the time of arrest or detention. Moreover, access to a consulate could
benefit counsel's development of mitigating evidence including securing medical records, school records, records of prior criminal activity,
and character witnesses. This evidence could be exclusively located in
the defendant's homeland, and, therefore, only accessible through the
means provided for in the Vienna Convention.
The violation of the Vienna Convention is a relatively new claim for
capital defendants. Although the court of appeals in Murphy's case
stymied the claim, its holding was primarily based on procedural default.
Capital defense counsel should not surrender the issue, but rather should
raise it at the trial level, should develop a factual record for it, and should
preserve it at every level.
II. The Procedural Default of Murphy's Vienna Convention
Claim
A.

source consulted by "a reasonably diligent" counsel representing a
36
foreign national.
In rejecting Murphy's argument that his failure to raise the Vienna
Convention claim in state court was a result of the Commonwealth's
failure to advise him of his Convention rights, the court of appeals found
that Murphy had failed to show any "'external impediment preventing
[his] counsel from constructing or raising the claim.' 37 The court
offered no further explanation of this reasoning, leaving capital defense
counsel uncertain as to what constitutes an "external impediment" and to
38
what degree it must prevent counsel from making a claim.
Again, the lesson to be learned from Murphy's failed attempts to
avoid procedural default is the importance of raising issues in state court
and preserving them for appeal. Awareness of the Vienna Convention as
a source of claims for capital defendants, specifically foreign nationals,
is growing. 39 Hopefully, this growing awareness will prompt capital
defense counsel to raise Vienna Convention claims prior to the trial in
state court. Upon failure to raise the issue, habeas counsel faced with the
task of showing cause for procedural default of a Vienna Convention
claim must be prepared to meet the Murphy court's "external impediment" standard. It will obviously not be enough to claim that the
Commonwealth violated the Vienna Convention by denying a defendant
access to his or her consul. Habeas counsel will need to show how the
denial and subsequent violation actually prevented the defendant's
counsel from raising the claim.
B.

Standard for Prejudice

Murphy argued that he was prejudiced by the Commonwealth's
violation of the Vienna Convention, in that the consulate could have
helpedhim eitherobtain apleabargain or acquire mitigating evidence for
the sentencing hearing. 40 Specifically, Murphy argued that the Mexican
consulate could have helped him avoid a sentence of death which he
asserted was the product of ethnic discrimination. 4 1 The court rejected

Standard for Cause

In Wainwrightv. Sykes,32 the United States Supreme Courtheld that
a petitioneris procedurally barred from raising a claim in a federal habeas
corpus proceeding if that issue could have been presented on direct
appeal or in a state habeas proceeding, unless the petitioner can establish
cause for the default and resulting prejudice. 33 In Murphy's case, the
court of appeals noted that even if Murphy could appeal the district
court's decision, the court of appeals would find his Vienna Convention
claim to be procedurally barred because he did not raise it in state court
34
and failed to show cause and prejudice for his default.
In attempting to show cause for not raising the Vienna Convention
claim in state court, Murphy argued that the claim was novel and that the
state had not informed him of his rights under the Convention. 35 The
court of appeals soundly rejected Murphy's novelty argument, stating
that the Convention has been in effect since 1969, and "a reasonably
diligent search" would have uncovered the existence andrelevance of the
Convention. Moreover, the court noted that treaties should be the first

31 Murphy, 116 F.3d at 100. Hence, the court of appeals seemed to
condone the Commonwealth's denial of Murphy's individual rights.
32 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
33 Id. at 87. The Wainwright Court declined to give precise
definitions of the "cause-and- prejudice" standard, leaving the issue for
future decisions. Id. at 87. See also Bassette v. Thompson, 915 F.2d 932
(4th Cir. 1990)(holding that federal habeas petitioner cannot raise claim
in federal habeas petition that he has never brought in any state court).
34
Murphy, 116 F.3d at 100.
35
Id.

36 To illustrate its "reasonably diligent search" argument, the court
cited several cases in which defendants raised Vienna Convention
claims. Id.at 100. Murphy, however, had different counsel representing
him in the state and federal court proceedings. Particularly since this is
a capital case and there is a life at stake, the court could have given
consideration to the fact that Murphy's habeas counsel did conduct "a
reasonably diligent search" and raised the Vienna Convention as soon as
he learned of its applicability.
37
Id.at 100 (quoting Murray v. Carrier,477 U.S. 478, 492, 106
S.Ct. 2639,2648 (1986)).
38 The court notes that the factual predicate for the Vienna Convention claim was that Murphy was a citizen ofMexico and that this fact was
within Murphy's knowledge. Id. at 100. Nevertheless, even though
Murphy obviously knew he was aMexican citizen, he did not necessarily
know that he was entitled to certain rights under the Vienna Convention.
Furthermore, knowledge of his citizenship did not mean that Murphy
knew to tell his counsel about his citizenship in order to invoke his rights
under the Convention.
39 Mario Murphy's September 17, 1997, execution generated a
significant amount of publicity concerning his claim that the Commonwealth violated the Vienna Convention. The government of Mexico and
the United States Department of State appealed to the Governor of
Virginia to reconsider the execution, both citing the importance of the
Vienna Convention.
40
Murphy, 116 F.3d at 100-101.
41
Id. at 101. There was a total ofsix people involvedin the murderfor-hire scheme that lead to Murphy's conviction. Four of the codefendants received plea bargains, resulting in life sentences. The victim's
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Murphy's claim that his sentence was the product of ethnic discrimination and found instead that Murphy possessed a greater degree of
culpability than the codefendants. 42 Even if discrimination was involved, the court reasoned that Murphy failed to offer any evidence that
his consulate could have provided him with assistance not provided by
43
his counsel.
Likewise, the court rejected Murphy's claim that he was prejudiced
by his inability to obtain mitigating evidence through his consulate. In
rejecting this claim, the court cited the district court's finding that
Murphy made no showing of what evidence his consulate would have
provided. 44 According to the court ofappeals,Murphy didnot show how
he needed the consulate's help in order to obtain character testimony, and
even if he had, the court did not see how such testimony would have been
any different from that offered at Murphy's sentencing hearing.

wife, who refused a bargain, was convicted and sentenced to life.
Murphy was the only one of the six not offered a plea bargain.
42
Id. The court agreed with the prosecutor's determination that
Murphy was more culpable because of his primary role in the murder and
his efforts to recruit others to help carry out the murder.
43
Id.
44Murphy, 116 F.3d at 101.

In these few sentences, the court of appeals managed to establish an
extremely high standard for capital defendants attempting to show the
existence of prejudice from a procedurally defaulted Vienna Convention
claim. Murphy illustrates that, in the eyes of the court of appeals, it
simply will not be enough to say the defendant might have obtained this
evidence or assistance if the defendant had received his Convention
rights. Habeas counsel will have to produce actual evidence that the
defendant would have received from his or her consulate. For example,
if counsel wanted to submit testimony of a character witness, counsel
would actually have to produce the witness and the witness' testimony.
This requirement of actuality also applies to the contents of any records
that a consulate would have acquired on behalf of the defendant.
Consequently, counsel must present as much actual evidence as possible
in order to prevail on a showing of prejudice on a procedurally defaulted
claim.
The fundamental lesson here is that capital defense counsel should
avoid a procedural default bind at all costs, but if counsel does find a
client in such a situation, counsel must make showings of both cause and
actual prejudice.
Summary and analysis by:
Mary K. Martin

POPE v. NETHERLAND
113 F.3d 1364 (4th Cir. 1997)1
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACTS
On the evening of January 12, 1986, Carlton Jerome Pope shot and
killed Cynthia Gray. While sitting in her car in the parking lot of"Nicks
Pool Hall" in downtown Portsmouth with Marcie Ann Kirchheimer,
Gray and Kirchheimer were approached by Pope. Pope asked Gray for
a ride home and she agreed. Pope got into the back seat of the car and the
three of them departed. After making one short stop, Pope directed Gray
to Bagley Street where she stopped the car. Immediately after exiting the
car, Pope turned toward the two women, pointed a pistol at them and
demanded all their money. When the women made no immediate
response, Pope fired a shot into Gray's head. Kirchheimer reached up
from thepassenger seat and briefly struggled withPope for the gun. After
he pulled free, Pope took a couple of steps away from the car, turned
around and shot Kirchheimer in the back of the head. He then fled the
scene. Gray died from the gun-shot wound to the head. Kirchheimer
2
survived and testified against Pope at his trial.
Kirchheimer told the police that Pope had taken nothing from her,
but that Gray had been carrying a clutch-type purse which was missing
after the shooting. Kirchheimer last remembered seeing the purse between the front seats. Although Kirchheimer did not actually see Pope

1 The United States Supreme Court, with Justices Stevens and
Ginsburg dissenting, recently denied Pope's petition for a writ of
certiorari. Pope v. Pruett, 1997 WL 429193 (U.S. Aug. 19, 1997). On
that same day, Carlton Jerome Pope was executed by lethal injection.
2
pope v. Netherland, 113 F.3d 1364, 1367 (4th Cir. 1997).

take the purse, she testified that "it was in his view and that he had ample
opportunity 'to grab it without [her] seeing him.'"3
The police examined the car shortly after the two women arrived at
the hospital. In the car, the police found a wine bottle from which they
obtained a fingerprint which positively matched Pope's fingerprint. In
addition to the wine bottle, the police found a checkbook belonging to
Gray in the car between the passenger seat and door. Kirchheimer
testified that Gray had written and cashed a check from her checkbook
earlier that evening and had then placed the checkbook back in her
4
purse.
The jury convicted Pope of capital murder in the commission of a
robbery pursuant to Virginia Code Section 18.2-31(d) 5 and sentenced
him to death. On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed
Pope's conviction and sentence. 6 The supreme court held that "where a
killing and a [larceny] are so closely related in time, place, and causal
3

Pope v. Netherland, 113 F.3d 1364,1367 (4th Cir. 1997) (quoting
Popev. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 114, 119,360 S.E.2d 352,355 (1987)).
4 During Pope's second state habeas proceeding, the Commonwealth produced bank records that indicated that the check Gray wrote
that night did not come from the checkbook found in the car. Thus, in his
second state and federal habeas petitions, Pope contended that the
Commonwealth violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by
failing to disclose exculpatory evidence. Additionally, Pope contended
that the Commonwealth knowingly presented Kirchheimer's false testimony. See, infra, note 56 and accompanying text.
5 This section has since been amended and changed to Virginia
Code Section 18.2-31(4) (1995). See, infra, note 22.
6 Pope v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 114, 360 S.E.2d 352 (1987).

